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Abstract. Research proposing the application of blockchain technology in 
accounting assumes the utilization of decentralized consensus mechanisms 
based on the exertion of scarce resources (Proof-of-Work; PoW), leading to the 
validation of transactions without the need of any third party. Together with the 
blockchain, a shared database, PoW is expected to lead to nearly immutable 
and, therefore, fraud-resistant, real-time financial registers. This conclusion 
must be reconsidered, taking into account recurrent top-management 
involvement in accounting scandals, often conducted through deliberate 
exposures of internal and external control systems. This paper asserts that 
blockchain-based accounting using PoW-based consensus paves the way for the 
suspension of controls by the management, since exerting the majority of 
computer power is easier than circumventing internal and external control 
systems in conventional accounting systems. Alternatives to PoW must be 
considered for blockchain-based accounting that prevents the management from 
conducting fraud and, thereby, qualifies the blockchain for its application in 
accounting. 
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1 The Blockchain: The New Cure All? 
Today, blockchain technology in combination with decentralized consensus 
mechanisms (DCMs) and its application in various business sectors is on everyone’s 
lips. Blockchains are shared databases that are maintained and verified amongst actors 
that participate in a network, ensuring digital transparency and confidence of records 
of information without a trusted third party [26]. Whereas the financial sector was an 
early adopter, the demand for the technology has increased over the past years and 
comes from diverse industries, such as health care or logistics. This demand is not 
surprising, given the blockchain’s ability to enable decentralized autonomous 
business models, defined by self-governed programs through decentralized 
governance and collective consensus [27]. In particular, this allows the execution of 
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Turing-complete codes for so-called smart-contracts, leading to self-executing 
programs that automatically enforce properties of digital contracts [35].  
One major business sector expected to benefit from the features of the blockchain 
is accounting. In particular, blockchains may facilitate the maintenance of permanent 
and timely records of financial transactions [36]. Its decentralized and transparent 
nature further implies potential immutability, meaning that financial records cannot be 
altered ex post and, if so, the probability of detection will be very high [2]. Thus, 
blockchain-based accounting could possibly rule out the conduction and concealment 
of improper accounting methods, illicit structuring of transactions and financial 
database manipulations [16]. The possibility of blockchain-based accounting, 
therefore, has recently become an intensively discussed issue, not only in an industrial 
[2, 34] but also in an academic context [8, 25, 36]. The growing interest in this topic 
is also reflected by the formation of several start-ups offering blockchain-based 
services for decentralized bookkeeping, such as Factom [37] or Scorechain [38]. 
Overall, the application of blockchain technology in the context of accounting could 
be conducive to the industry, which is still mainly based on standardized technology 
such as computer assisted audit techniques [2]. As the digitization of accounting is 
still in its infancy, the application of blockchain technology may leads to the 
technological progress needed.  
However, industrial and academic advocates of blockchain-based accounting seem 
to neglect the still present and well-known challenges of proper accounting that is top-
management involvement in accounting fraud [17, 32]. The severity of this topic gets 
obvious when looking, for instance, at fraud incidents in the United States, where 
accounting fraud conducted by the management amounts to 89 percent of all financial 
statement fraud cases of public companies [3]. The following paper investigates 
whether the blockchain is qualified for an application in accounting. To this end, it is 
investigated how the management is able to conduct fraud and whether the proposed 
intra-corporate blockchain application is able to decrease the opportunities to commit 
fraud. Accordingly, it is assumed that there exist incentives for the management to 
commit fraud, however, there might be technical mechanisms for its actual 
prevention. Most of all, this implies an investigation of DCMs regarding their ability 
to impede the management from conducting accounting fraud.  
The paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a case study of the 
Comroad accounting scandal and investigates the used manipulation and concealment 
techniques. Based on this case study, a generalization of the fraud pattern and the 
relationships between internal and external control systems is deducted, using 
additional scientific literature to support the identified relationship in the case of 
Comroad. Section 3 subsequently presents a layer model for blockchain 
customization, on which basis a scenario for blockchain-based accounting systems is 
developed. Using the scenario as well as the general fraud pattern and opportunities to 
commit fraud, identified in section 1, various DCMs are investigated concerning their 
ability to serve as technical mechanism for fraud prevention. 
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2 How to Conduct Accounting Fraud: A Case Study & Analysis 
Accounting fraud is the deliberatively attempt to prepare and disseminate material 
that misstates a company’s financial situation [32]. Involvement of the top 
management, such as Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and/or Chief Financial 
Officers (CFOs), in accounting fraud (hereafter: management accounting fraud, MAF) 
is frequently observed [3]. Thereby, MAF includes either direct involvement of top-
management in conducting accounting fraud or indirect involvement by convincing or 
enforcing the provision of fraud by other parties. To identify the requirements on 
blockchains in respect to MAF prevention, a case study of the Comroad accounting 
fraud scandal and a generalization of this case for a further analysis are provided.  
 
2.1 The Comroad Accounting Scandal 
Comroad was a German telematics service provider, who developed worldwide 
applicable, server-based traffic systems. These systems were sold to trading partners, 
whereas retailers offered the systems as well as complementary services to end-
costumers [15]. Comroad entered the international trading floor in the beginning of 
1999, whereas it sales quadrupled at the end of this year, compared to its prior year’s 
level of DM4.6 million. Afterwards, the company exhibited exorbitant growth 
perspectives, despite overall negative trends in the industry. In particular, Comroad 
forecasted an increase of sales to DM250 million in 2002 [15]. 
Comroad’s success story, however, turned out to be one of the major accounting 
scandals of publicly traded firms in Germany. Sales developments were the result of 
numerous fictitious transactions, for which Comroad invented commercial 
relationships with non-existing trading partners, amounting to €19.9 million as 
declared in Comroad’s financial annual report [11]. One of those trading partners was 
a company named VT Electronics, which was allegedly in charge of the production 
and deliver of board computers on behalf of Comroad. However, VT Electronics was 
only collecting money from likewise fictitious end-customers. For the purpose of 
concealment, payment from end-customers was cleared with the production costs of 
equipment of VT Electronics and by down payment for further hardware and possible 
retained surpluses. The only task of Comroad was to prepare invoices and to pretend 
that invoices were send to end-customers. Comroad stated additional transactions with 
various other Asian trading partners following a similar fraud pattern [15]. 
Surprisingly, the illicit practices of Comroad were not detected over a period of three 
years and despite of various controls in accordance to national and international legal 
requirements (e.g. the Germany Stock Corporation Act (AktG), Euro-Bilanzgesetz 
(EuroBilG)) as well as standards for accounting (e.g. IFRS). Thus, in the following 
the manipulation and concealment techniques of Comroad will be discussed. 
2.2 The Manipulation and Concealment Techniques of Comroad 
Dorin [15] describes several incidents of MAF and also the previously presented case 
study of Comroad by using the so-called swiss cheese model. The model shows, how 
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systems may breakdown due to human intended or unintended as well as technical 
failures [28]. Accordingly, MAF may be conducted despite the existence of several 
legally required and/or voluntarily implemented firewalls, i.e. internal and external 
control systems as well as technical precautions. Perpetrators of fraud are able to 
circumvent those controls and security measures by using the system’s deficiencies 
(loopholes) for their own benefit [15]. 
According to German regulations, the publicly traded company Comroad was 
managed by a two-tier board structure consisting of the management, responsible for 
the oversight of day-to-day business operations, and the board of directors, 
responsible for oversight of the management and acting as final authority with respect 
to decision making [1]. Despite this top-down approach of control, additional internal 
controls are legally required, for example, according to the AktG [13], the Act for 
Control and Transparency in the Corporate Sector (KonTraG) [7], as well as auditing 
standards such as IDW PS 261 [18]. Internal controls are measures and methods 
adapted to safeguard assets of a company as well as to check the accuracy of 
bookkeeping [7]. However, there exist no specified requirements for the corporate-
specific design of internal control systems in the German legislation. In general, the 
board of directors is under legal obligation to monitor the implementation and 
development of an adequate internal control system, which may includes internal 
auditors and/or an audit committee [7].  
In the case of Comroad, it seems obvious that neither the board of directors nor the 
internal control system was sufficient to prevent the deduction of accounting fraud. 
Particularly, the CEO of Comroad was able to bypass and to suspend the internal 
control system  – a practice called management override of internal controls [9] – by 
staffing the board of directors with his wife, who was involved in the fraudulent 
activities, thereby undermining the board’s independence. As a consequence, the 
board tolerated the illicit practices [15] as well as the internal auditor, who received 
monetary remuneration for the maintained silence [10]. Despite the arrangements 
within the company, the establishment of a close relationship to the external auditor 
KPMG, by which both parties received mutual advantages, offset external controls. 
Lastly, financial statement users such as investors, the stock market as well as 
supervisory authorities, were misled and deceived, as they relied to a great extend on 
the audited and certified financial statements attested by KPMG [11, 15].  
2.3 Generalization: Dependencies in Control Systems and Accounting Fraud 
The described hierarchy of the company, the external and internal control system as 
well as the associated relationships between the control systems and organs in the 
context of the Comroad scandal are transferred to an arbitrarily chosen stock company 
i, to which the German Stock Corporation Act applies. The identified loopholes in the 
control systems of Comroad are generalized and crosschecked by the economic 
literature, among others [1, 3, 6, 15] as well as [32], and combined in Figure 1. For 
example, existing theoretical or empirical work about the management’s influence on 
the board of director’s independence [1] and other relationships [4, 9] were reviewed, 
by which the management is able to exert control over the board. Solid lines indicate 
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that there is a broad consensus about the indicated relationship in the examined 
literature, whereas dashed lines emphasize controversies. The influence of the 
management on the board of directors is determined by a variety of factors, such as 
the geographically disparity or career perspectives of board members. However, the 
strong influence of the management on the board of directors in the case of Comroad 
can be substantiated by a large part of the literature and is, therefore, assumed within 
Figure 1. It should be noted that the emphasized relationships are not generally true, 
but may be part of the problem when considering the emergence of MAF.  
 
Analyzing Figure 1, the existence of circular references between the management, 
the board of directors and the internal control system get apparent. In particular, if the 
board of directors depends partly or completely on the management and if the internal 
control system is determined by the management, than there exist no internal 
mechanism that might prevent the management from conducting accounting fraud by 
the exertion of effective controls. This observation is supported by the findings of 
Sawyer [30] as well as Caplan [9], noticing that the management will always be able 
to override internal controls, especially because they are able to choose the strength of 
these systems through its influence on the board. Moreover, if management override 
of controls happens, there is no obvious reason for external auditors to revise their 
evaluation of management integrity [9, 22], leading to additional negative effects for 
the effectiveness of controls. Despite the effects of external auditors are controversial 
discussed, the observations of [9, 22] coincide with those in the case of Comroad, 
where the assurance service of external auditor seems to have deteriorated and, 
therefore, was not able to deter management fraud [15]. Moreover, these 
inefficiencies are expected to exert further negative effects on the external control 
system, that is, first of all, external auditors, as well as the market, which typically 
trust (at least to a great extend) third-party financial audit [22]. 
Overall, this leads to the conclusion that the core of the management’s ability to 
conduct and conceal accounting fraud is an inefficient internal control system 
resulting from a dependent board of directors, which is strongly influenced by the 
management. Based on this observation, a first step towards the prevention of MAF 
seems to be the strengthening of the independence of both mechanisms. This can be 
Figure 1. Stylized illustration of a company's control system and dependencies 
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done in terms of impeding the management’s influence on the internal control system 
and the board of directors as well as by the avoidance of interdependencies between 
those entities and control systems. Second, MAF can also be prevented by decreasing 
the probability of successful concealment of fraud through the covering up of tracks, 
i.e through database manipulations and the circumvention of technical precautions. 
Consequently, an effective strategy for the prevention of MAF must take into account 
an organizational as well as a technical perspective. 
2.4 Could Blockchains Prevent Accounting Fraud? 
In view of the above considerations, the suitability of the blockchain for accounting 
must be discussed, as several academic and industrial research papers propose this, 
e.g. [2, 8, 36]. Certainly, the blockchain in combination with decentralized consensus 
induces organizational transformation through the decentralization of single business 
processes and by the potential increased involvement of employees because of high 
transparency. For instance, decentralized consensus could potentially raise employee 
involvement in accounting issues and the validation of business transactions, leading 
to more diversified controls through the transparency induced by the blockchain. 
Financial transparency is a major issue in accounting and for the internal control 
system, which is concerned about the openness and availability of information [20] 
that could potentially be moderated by the blockchain. Moreover, facilitating the 
involvement of employees could solve a frequently mentioned problem in internal 
control systems, which are claimed to be design, using an excessive agency view that 
promotes a strong adversarial relationship between the management and shareholders, 
but leaves out the relationship of the management and employees [32]. Summarized, 
given the potential organizational changes induced be the blockchain, it can be 
concluded that it is worthwhile to have a closer look on the technology and the impact 
of organizational restructuring. From a technical view, the blockchain is expected to 
introduce immutability of data stored on the blockchain, a feature that is frequently 
mentioned not only in the context of its possible application in accounting, e.g. [2, 8, 
25]. This argument is based on the assumption to apply a proof-of-work (PoW) based 
DCM, which is a cryptographic puzzle, consisting of solving a mathematical problem 
by the exertion of computer power. In particular, PoW is a mechanism to ration 
resource access in client-server relationships and consist in finding a byte string 
combined with a block header, which results in a cryptographic hash that can only be 
done by the exertion of computer power [12]. Given this assumption, the suitability of 
an application of the blockchain for accounting will be analyzed not only with respect 
to the organizational transformations but also concerning the applied DCM. 
3 Blockchain Customization and Organizational Restructuring 
In this section, the structure and possible customization of the blockchain will be 
discussed in the context of a business environment. Based on the blockchain design 
decisions, a scenario for blockchain-based accounting will be presented.  
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3.1 The Blockchain in a Business Environment: Structure and Customization 
Using a very basic definition, a blockchain is a synchronized global log of events 
between nodes in a peer-to-peer network. Particularly, a blockchain is replicated at 
every node and assists nodes in reaching consensus on the state of all accounts [26]. 
Blockchains can be customized for special use cases and adjusted to business 
environments, which is illustrated by a layer model presented in Figure 3. It is 
assumed that the layers overlap and are partially interconnected. The layer model 
provides an overview on how blockchains may fit in and support a company by 
providing deployment choices and by enabling flexibility. 
At the lowest layer the blockchain provides a digital infrastructure, called 
distributed ledger. This basic infrastructure consists of three elements: The peer-to-
peer network consists of homogenous nodes and is characterized by the ability to exist 
without a central node, responsible for network control. In the context of the 
blockchain, each node keeps a complete replica of all data needed to independently 
verify the validity of any data that should be incorporated into the distributed ledger. 
Before data are incorporated they must be broadcasted through the network. After 
broadcasting, a common order over data has to be agreed among the nodes, which is a 
non-trivial problem in a distributed network, known as the Byzantines generals 
problem [21]. This problem is solved by a cryptographically puzzle and the exertion 
of computer power by which a particular target value must be found (PoW; note that 
this mechanism will be explained in greater detail later). After reaching consensus, 
data are logged and permanently stored in the distributed ledger. At this level the 
customization of the blockchain for a business environment and/or application may 
happens by the choice of general rules according to which consensus is found.  
The second layer is characterized by the choice of different deployment modes 
that depend on the desired openness of the peer-to-peer network and the type of data 
validation. Blockchains can either feature permission-less access or permissioned 
access. In the former case, everyone is able to participate as node and no prior 
authorization is needed [25]. Contrarily, blockchains that are characterized by 
permissioned access pre-select their participating nodes, e.g. through white- or 
blacklisting and some type of gatekeeping mechanism [31]. Irrespective of the access 
type, the validation of the blockchain can be either performed in a decentralized way 
or by one particular or several nodes, i.e. centralized validation. Despite this sounds 
counterintuitive using a DCMs, centralization may stems from the fact that the 
validation is transmitted to a set of changing nodes (e.g. delegated proof-of-work) that 
are responsible for the validation, for instance, to avoid too much overhead and to 
allow for low latency. Contrarily, decentralized validation is characterized by the fact 
that all nodes in the network are able to validate data that should be incorporated into 
the blockchain. Typically, permission-less decentralized ledgers are featured by 
decentralized validation (e.g. Bitcoin) whereas permissioned ledgers use centralized 
validation. However, every other combination or hybrid form are conceivable [31]. 
This definition excludes unintended centralization, for instance, through the undesired 
accumulation of the majority of computer power in the case of PoW. 
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On the third level, the blockchain is shaped by system design decisions in regard 
to the foundation and integration of the envisaged application. This includes that 
rules within the application must be designed in accordance to the particular business 
process or compliance requirements. In contrast to the general rules mentioned in the 
first layer that, these specific rules state additional, technical feasible requirements. 
For example, these rules may obey requirements referring to a specific section of the 
AktG. Moreover, a service-oriented architecture (SOA) might be taken into 
accounting, if a blockchain application must be integrated within an existing 
enterprise systems [33]. However, most likely not only the interaction of the 
blockchain and decentralized consensus with other information systems must be 
considered, but also user interaction. Nevertheless these system design decisions are 
only exemplary and customization may include numerous other aspects. 
 
 
Lastly, on the top layer particular applications are built on the basis of the 
preceding layer decisions. For example, smart contracts can be implemented for 
insurance services or digital rights management. However, as depicted in Figure 3, 
applications of the blockchain can relate to various business sectors, whereas this list 
is not exhaustive. Lastly, apart from the fact that the blockchain itself offers particular 
security features through cryptography, additional security mechanisms might be 
implemented on the upper layer. Depending on the concrete application, these 
mechanisms may range from additional data securing mechanism and fraud detection 
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3.2 Scenario: Blockchain-Based Accounting and Organizational Changes 
Proposed applications of the blockchain for accounting vary significantly from joint 
registers [2] to intra-firm blockchain-based record keeping [8, 34, 36]. However, 
industrial and academic literature lack a description on the concrete implementation 
of the blockchain as well as application scenarios, on which basis the blockchain and 
the proposed DCM can be evaluated. Contrarily, this paper develops a scenario for a 
blockchain-based accounting system using the layer model for customization. 
As depicted in Figure 3, the basic infrastructure of the proposed accounting system 
is the distributed ledger, where business transactions are referenced on as monetary 
value and not as tokens. The deployment model of the blockchain is a private 
blockchain maintained by a network of individuals within the company that validate 
transactions, here called intra-corporate blockchain. Particularly, intra-corporate 
blockchains are chosen in this paper, since full transparency of sensitive financial data 
to particular companies or - in an extreme scenario - to the general public could lead 
to severe losses in competitive advantages for an individual company. For example, 
lawfully discretionary accounting practices would be no longer feasible, which could 
be exploited by competitors, whose financial data are not completely transparent. 
Thus, the following scenario is inspired by the facts from the Comroad study and the 
obligation of German stock companies for publishing annual accounts (AktG), which 
not implies full and real-time transparency. A comparison of intra- and inter-corporate 
ledgers is purposely excluded by referring to the associated strong focus of this study. 
 
Figure 3. Scenario of a blockchain-based accounting 
The network is assumed to consist of employees, especially, the accounting 
department, the management, and associated control entities that are the board of 
directors and an optional internal auditor or an audit committee, which together build 
the pool of consensus participants. Employees are likely to be enforced to participate 
on the consensus, as part of their work assignment. In contrast, executives and 
shareholders are assumed to act in their own interest and participate either because 
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or in a positive way, as shareholder are likely to be concerned about the accuracy of 
the financial situation. Consensus is found in accordance to the PoW mechanism, 
which is assumed as DCM in all identified papers that propose an application of 
blockchain technology for accounting, e.g. [2, 8, 36]. In this system, consensus will 
only be found if transactions are in accordance to the pre-specified rules. Consensus 
participants will reject transactions that are not compliant. Valid transactions are 
subsequently logged and serve as publicly available source of information within the 
company and to particular outsiders (e.g. external auditors). Simultaneously, 
consensus participants are the source of information by conducting transactions via 
the accounting system and broadcasting it to the rest of the network for validation. 
4 Can We Prevent Management Accounting Fraud? 
In the following, PoW as well as alternative DCMs will be investigated and assessed 
concerning their ability to prevent MAF. According to the previously presented 
scenario the decentralized consensus cannot be separated from the peer-to-peer 
network. Thus, it is acknowledged that there exist threats that result from the peer-to-
peer network. Related attacker scenarios are, among others, Sybil attacks, Eclipse 
attacks, Byzantines Joint attacks as well as Churn attacks [14]. Secure blockchain-
based accounting system must account for those attacks. However, given numerous 
works dealing with the security of peer-to-peer networks, it is assumed that there exist 
mechanisms to provide a considerable security level for the network. Thus, in the 
following the focus lies on DCMs and their ability to prevent MAF. 
4.1 Management Override of Controls and Proof-of-Work Based Consensus 
PoW is a mechanism to rationing resource access in client-server relationships, 
consisting of solving a mathematical puzzle, using computer power [5]. Particularly, 
PoW consists in finding a byte string, called nonce that combined with the block 
header, results in a cryptographic hash with a given number of leading zero bits. A 
block contains all transactions, which have been committed on the previous block. 
Finding a nonce, can only be done by calculating the hash of the block for all possible 
nonces [12]. In addition, each block references to the preceding block, which hash has 
to be known, meaning that blockchains represent consensus over the history of data 
stored on the blockchain. The history is considered as true, when it deploys the 
longest chains, conforming to the exertion of the most power exertion. Thus, if 
someone wants to revert the history, an alternative reality must be created (blockchain 
fork), which occurs if not all nodes agree on the same blockchain header [12]. The 
blockchain fork will only be accepted if it becomes longer than the already existing 
blockchain, which implies the exertion of a huge amount of computer power, starting 
from the point that should to be altered (51% attack). This requires not only 
computational power but also faster data processing than the rest of the network [26]. 
While PoW seems to provide a reasonable level of security in large networks, 
small-scale networks have been proofed to remain vulnerable of 51% attacks [5]. In 
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particular, this holds for intra-corporate blockchain-based accounting systems, where 
the management is potentially able to deliberately reach the majority of computer 
power. Without convincing, enforcing or circumventing exiting internal and external 
control systems as well as technical barriers, the management could simply use 
computers or a single server, which have more computing power than the remaining 
participants of the network for the effortless override of internal controls. Moreover, 
if logged transaction can be altered or possible deleted ex post, transparency of 
financial information is useless. This leads to the aforementioned negative effects on 
the external control system, as retrospective fraud detection mechanisms that may be 
conducted through external auditors are getting ineffective and subsequently also 
large parts of investors or exchange market participants, which rely on disclosed and 
allegedly external audited financial information. Consequently, using PoW as DCM 
for blockchain-based accounting, MAF will not be impeded, neither from an 
organizational perspective by decentralization nor through immutability of data, i.e. 
the technical perspective. Notably, PoW would even ease the override of controls, as 
the management does not need to convince others to support and conceal the fraud 
such as in the case of Comroad. This especially holds in the absence of direct 
monetary incentives that encourage honest behavior such as in the case of Bitcoin.   
4.2 Alternative Decentralized Consensus Mechanisms  
Table 1 provides an overview over DCMs developed after the emergence of PoW. For 
the sake of completeness PoW-based consensus is also included. A differentiation of 
the DCMs is conducted according to their ability to allow for permission-less or 
permissioned access of nodes as well as whether the mechanisms facilitate 
decentralized validation or not. This differentiation is done in accordance to the 
second layer of the model presented in Figure 3. 
Table 1.  Overview of decentralized consensus mechanisms after the emergence of PoW 




• Proof-of-Stake  
• Proof-of-Work based 
derivatives 
• Federated Byzantines 
Agreement  
• Proof-of-Work  
• Proof-of-Stake  
• Proof-of-Work based derivatives 
• Federated Byzantines Agreement  
Centralized 
Validation • Delegated Proof-of-Stake  
• Redundant Byzantines Fault 
Tolerance 
• Ripple consensus  
• Bilateral node-to-node (N2N) 
• RAFT and derivatives  
• Delegated Proof-of-Stake 
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Certain DCMs enable both, permissioned as well as permission-less access 
(although they might designed to be used in a permission-less system at first). 
Contrarily, it is assumed that a mechanism, by intention, will not feature decentralized 
validation and centralized validation at the same time. However, it is acknowledged 
that in practice decentralized validation may exhibit centrality tendencies. In the 
following, DCMs will be analyzed, if they feature permissioned access as well as 
decentralized validation and are, therefore, suited for an application according to the 
preciously presented scenario of blockchain-based accounting.  
Proof-of-Stake 
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) is based on the assumption that PoW’s dependence on energy 
consumption creates unnecessary cost overhead in networks. PoS is a form of proof of 
ownership of the currency in the network [19]. Instead of using relative hash rates of 
miners for network stability, the protocol splits blocks and the according transactions 
proportionally to the current wealth of miners [26]. In a blockchain-based accounting 
system stakes will most likely be stocks. As the management will probably have the 
majority of stocks (this was also observed in the case of the Comroad scandal [15]), 
the management would be enabled to change financial transaction registers at their 
will, without having to respect any control system. Thus, despite the Proof-of-Stake is 
initially designed to promote decentralized validation, in practice the validation of 
transaction using this mechanism will be centralized and most likely led by the 
management.  Moreover the protocol exhibits other general security issued, such as 
the so-called “nothing at stake” attack, where attackers can commit collateral as they 
can go back and rewrite history from a point where they still had stake [19]. 
Proof-of-Work Based Derivatives  
Proof-of-Activity (PoA) is a combination of PoW and the PoS and described as one 
example of different PoW derivatives. Finding consensus by using PoA consists of 
the transformation of a pseudorandom value into a satoshi, which is the smallest unit 
of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. According to [6], this is done by selecting a 
pseudorandom index between zero and the total number of satoshis in existence up to 
the last block, inspecting the block in which this satoshi was minted and following 
each transaction that subsequently transferred this satoshi to an address until reaching 
the address that currently controls this satoshi. Only active stakeholders, who 
maintain a node, get rewarded in exchange for the service they provide for the 
network. Despite PoA induces less overhead in terms of communication, it does not 
prevents “nothing-at-stake”-attacks [6] and therefore, does not guarantee for the fraud 
resistance of data on the blockchain. For the sake of completeness it should be 
mentioned that there exist further DCMs such as proof-of-capacity or proof-of-burn 
that are based on or are related to PoW. However, they are rather used for distributed 
payment systems and rarely discussed for other appliances in a scientific context. 
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Federated Byzantines Agreement  
Federated Byzantines Agreement (FBA) allows each node to select a set of other 
trusted nodes, which induces so-called flexible trust, meaning that all users have the 
freedom to trust any combination of parties. Nodes may select those participants 
based on arbitrarily criteria such as repudiation. To find consensus, a node waits for 
the vast majority of trusted nodes (quorum slice set) to agree on a transaction before 
considering the transaction settled. In turn, those nodes do not agree to the transaction 
until the participants they consider as important agree to the transaction as well, and 
so on. The key distinction between the FBA and prior Byzantines Agreements is the 
individual and decentralized trust decisions. If enough network nodes accept a 
transaction, it becomes infeasible for an attacker to roll it back [23, 29]. Moreover, 
security rest on digital signatures and hash families whose parameters can realistically 
be tuned to protect against adversaries with unimaginably vase computing power [23]. 
Notably, the FBA is a majority voting system, related to the decisions of selected 
trusted nodes. As in every voting system and, especially, if voting nodes are known to 
each other in a closed system, strategic voting cannot be excluded. Thus, it may be 
easy for the management to couple votes of particular nodes and their influence on 
other nodes to career perspectives and/or monetary or non-monetary incentives, 
leading to a strong influence of the management on the voting outcome and data that 
will be incorporated on the blockchain. Moreover, the management may also be able 
to influence the majority of nodes to subsequently alter data on the blockchain to 
cover up traces. Consequently, FBA is not able to prevent the occurrence of MAF. 
5 Conclusion and Outlook 
Academic and industrial work proposing the application of blockchain technology for 
accounting emphasize the immutability of financial recording based on a proof-of-
work based decentralized consensus, probably leading to fraud-resistance. After 
identifying one of today’s core problems of proper accounting, i.e. MAF, and 
proposing a scenario for blockchain-based accounting within a public company, this 
paper asserts that PoW is not effective in terms of preventing MAF. This conclusion 
is based on the assumption that there exist no incentive that prevents the management 
from committing fraud in accordance to [9, 16, 32], rather it is the mechanism, here 
distributed consensus that probably could prevent the commitment of MAF. 
Moreover, proof-of-work is even expected to ease the conduction and concealment of 
MAF, owing to the prevailing centrality tendencies within the system. Alternative 
decentralized consensus protocols were examined in accordance to the presented 
scenario of blockchain-based accounting. This paper concludes that currently, there 
exist no DCMs that promote permissioned systems, featuring decentralized validation 
and simultaneously preventing MAF. Overall, the ability of the blockchain and DCMs 
in the proposed scenario might be overestimated or even overhyped, even if a certain 
general potential of the technology in accounting could be attested owing to its 
decentralized and transparent nature. However, proposals for concrete applications 
must be strongly oriented on the de facto problems such as in the case of accounting 
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and MAF. Accordingly, further research should focus on the development of 
advanced consensus mechanisms that take into account the above-discussed issues, 
and especially, the ability of management override of controls. Variations in the 
proposed scenario are also conceivable. Overall, a special emphasis should lie on the 
cost-efficiency of such systems as well as security as basic requirements. Without 
these two prerequisites it is hard to imagine that any such system will be implemented 
in the future. Moreover, a comparison of intra- and inter-corporate solution as well as 
other possible scenarios should be pursued, in order to receive a more compressive 
evaluation of the potential of blockchain-based accounting.  
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